The History
Any mention of the Kaveri Engine brings up visions of repeatedly missed deadlines, out of capabilities vision, underperformance & underinvestment. If a performance manager were to look at the Kaveri’s progress report, he/she will look to set up clear and realistic goals, realistic timelines & performance milestones with adequate investment across funding, human capital & materials.

Project Kaveri was launched in 1986 under the oversight of India’s GTRE (Gas Turbine Research Establishment) to develop an indigenous turbofan to power India’s then under development LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) which would become the Tejas.
GTRE already had experience working on turbojets dating back over 20 years. In 1956 (the same year as the first flight of the B-58 Hustler) the Indian Government decided to develop inhouse a Mach 2 capable multirole aircraft and appointed German, Kurt Tank ( responsible for the creation of many important German aircraft during WW2 including the FW190) as design lead. From the get go the project was heavily constrained by a limited industrial base (under British Rule the nascent Indian Industry was not allowed to grow) and even more limited funding, and developing an inhouse engine looked out of reach. The Indian Government made the first compromise here by looking outside India to develop/purchase the engines for the aircraft.
The original vision of the HF-24 Marut was envisioned to be a Mach 2 aircraft and needed capable engines. Finally the project settled on the Bristol Siddley Orpheus 703 engines already in use on aircraft such as the Gnat and Hunter for over a decade. The engine was non afterburning and developed 4.850 pounds of thrust each (the Marut had two). The limited power of the engines barely got the Marut upto Mach 0.95 and was considered inadequate by the Indian Air Force (IAF). Furthermore the Indian Government had turned down a $17.5 Mn proposal by Rolls Royce to improve the performance of the engine as they believed it expensive. Similar conversations with the USSR & Egypt produced no results. The Marut would serve its entire operational life with underpowered engines limiting capability. The aircraft retired from service in 1990.

By the early 1970s GTRE decided to improve the Orpheus engine performance by developing afterburners and the engine was certified in 1973-74 with between 5,700-6,500 pounds of thrust with afterburners at a temperature of 1,700°K. Unfortunately the engine design did not match the Marut’s and could not be integrated with the aircraft.
The 1974 Pokhran tests resulted in sanctions against India and finding replacement engine parts got to near impossible.These actions further incentivised GTRE to once again go back to the drawing boards and ungraded the afterburners to 2,000°K and reworked the engine’s subsonic compressor stages with a new transonic design that further improved the aging engine’s dry thrust. Unfortunately all of these efforts went in vain as the engine failed to integrate with the Marut (another airframe could have been developed). The plug was pulled on further engine development right about 1973-4 and the hardfought experience gained by a fledgling aerospace industry was put on hold for another four years.
The Kaveri History
In 1977 GTRE, still smarting under international sanctions, had developed an afterburning turbojet prototype, the GTX37-14U. The experience gained from working on the Orpheus 703 was of great help. It was the very first engine developed indigenously in India. The technology demonstrator was to showcase GTRE’s capabilities. A turbofan variant, the GTX37-14UB was constructed to further enhance GTRE’s capabilities. The GTX37-14U developed 14,550 pounds of thrust with afterburner and the GTX37-14UB developed over 20,000 pounds of thrust. Remember both the engines were proof of concept and should be viewed as such. The GTX37-14UB did have a large diameter frontal area considered ineffective for a fighter aircraft. Having said that India produced both an afterburning turbojet and turbofan by the time the project was completed in 1981. Both engines were stand alone projects (highlights the silos the various defense establishments operated in).Gas Turbine Research Establishment
A jet engine consists of the following stages, the intake, the compressors, the combustion chamber, the turbines and the afterburner. The intake is a critical element of any supersonic aircraft as air that is flowing at supersonic speeds needs to be slowed down to subsonic speeds for ingestion into the engine compressor, the intake includes elements of both the airframe and the engine and a fantastic example is the J-58 engine used in the Blackbird series of aircraft (https://theaviationevangelist.com/2025/11/21/the-blackbird-family-aircraft/ ). The compressors need to be optimized to take the air coming off the inlet, compress and fire it in the engine core (the Kaveri’s core is called Kabini) the combusted air is then blown through the turbines followed by the afterburner. Maintaining optimal pressure through the entire entire engine length is critical to the engine’s efficiency (will speak of materials later).
The Kaveri’s ‘Kabini’ core is a connecting element from India’s foundational GTX37-U engine to the current Kaveri GTX35-VS. Other than the core everything needed to be rethought as per the IAF’s changing needs(it is important to scope any project and not move the goalposts after scoping). The target thrust requirement for the Kaveri was 81kN or 18,210 pounds of thrust and multiple high altitude test runs in Russia on IL-76 Test Beds never produced a thrust of more than 15,800 pounds or 70.4kN. The K1 iteration of the engine’s dry thrust was never more than 49-51kN or 11,000 pounds.In addition the engine had a target weight of 1,100 kg or 2,450 pounds and the weight of the K1 engine never went below 1,423 kg or 3,139 pounds. The engine was off on both thrust and weight targets. In 2008 the engine was delinked from the LCA / Tejas program and iterations continued. By 2009 after years of weight saving efforts the weight came down to 1,235kg or 2,723 pounds.and a thrust of 65kN or 14,612 pounds of thrust with afterburner. As of 2024 the engine weight has been brought down to 1,180 kg or 2,601 pounds. The engine weight is still considerably heavier than the GE F404 engine used in the LCA/Tejas at 1,036kg or 2,284 pounds and 84.5kN / 19,000 pounds of thrust. The Kaveri has a ways to go. It can be said the delinking of the Kaveri program from the LCA/Tejas was a body blow as funding and Government interest was inconsistent(the IAF kept looking outside India for their immediate strategic needs). A derivative of the Kaveri in only dry form was tested in 2024, again in Russia and it developed 49-51 kN or approx 11,200 pounds of thrust.This engine will be used in India’s UCAV Ghatak program. DRDO Ghatak – Wikipedia . As per Wing Commdr R.K Narang, India’s aerospace independence is based on 4 pillars: a fighter aircraft, a transport aircraft , a UCAV & an engine. True independence can only be attained by having your own versatile multirole capable engine, and we now realize the importance of the Kaveri Engine. 107 – Kaveri, Naval Fighter, AMCA and Supercruise: Can India Build a Truly Indigenous Air Power?
Before we proceed into analyzing the improvement areas of the Kaveri program, it’s best we take a look at a couple of examples. The first is ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization) and their radical change post the Cryogenic Engine story of the 1990s and SAC (Strategic Air Command) in the USA, both of whom have created a vibrant ecosystem that encourages innovation and excellence, and yes works on improving failures.
Note: In Nov 2024 Bahmos Aerospace reported the development of an afterburner for the dry Kaveri engine increasing thrust from 50kN to 80kN (11,240 pounds & 17,985 pounds), almost at the thrust requirements of the Tejas. Certification of the same is expected in 2032 and is currently undergoing tests in Russia. GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri – Wikipedia

The Examples
In the early 1990s India’s ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization) and Russia’s Glavkosmos had almost reached a deal for the purchase of Cryogenic engines for India’s GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle). After going through multiple negotiations ISRO had reached the decision that the Russian cryogenic engine was the right engine at the right price. The United States citing violation under the Missile Control Technology Regime (MTCR) imposed sanctions on both ISRO & Glavkosmos (ISRO had earlier rejected the American proposal). The recently formed Russia (after the fall of the USSR) was under financial strain, could not stand up to the sanctions and backed out of the deal, leaving ISRO’s GSLV without engines.

A cryogenic engine is a rocket engine that uses liquefied oxygen and hydrogen stored at very low temperatures. The engines provide the highest thrust per unit of propellent mass as compared to other engines. These engines use specialized materials, handle extremely volatile liquid gasses under high pressure and sophisticated engineering to prevent propellent from boiling off under heat. All this needed to be developed inhouse now. There were fake controversies being generated against involved scientists ex: Nambi Narayan (who has been exonerated and compensated).
ISRO created an ecosystem that included companies like Godrej Aerospace & MTAR Technologies. Godrej established a vacuum brazing facility , a complex method of joining metal components at very low pressure (vacuum) in a furnace. Such a furnace eliminates gasses while joining metal sections of varying size , strengthening joints and eliminating oxidation. A critical property when operating under high pressure. MTAR Technologies created a turbopump. In the cryogenic engine the turbopump is a critical component to feed high pressure fluid into the combustion chamber. Such technologies are niche and needed to be developed in house.Developing such a high cost engine had high funding costs and this is where the public-private partnership (PPP) paid dividends. The government needed to be consistent while private entities developed the complex components.ISRO decided to step back from the day to process and instead became a technology incubator.
ISRO Scientists learned from failures and this became a consistent theme through the culture of the entire organization. A brilliant example of this is Chandrayaan 2 in 2019. The mission was to land the Vikram rover on the Moon, however due to issues that occurred during the landing sequence (15 minutes of terror) the spacecraft impacted hard on the Moon’s surface and Vikram lost communication. The Team at ISRO went through a root cause analysis and rectified the errors that caused the hard landing, built impact tolerances across the lander and the rover. In 2023 Chandrayaan 3 successfully landed on the moon.ISRO opts for ‘failure-based’ design for Chandrayaan-3 – Rediff.com Today India’s ISRO is known for commercially launching satellites for other countries at the most reasonable cost. At the heart of this story is India’s cryogenic engine, 100% Indian. The long road to cryogenic technology – The Hindu .

The SAC in the United States has created a similar ecosystem of contractors who have amassed formidable experience across multiple disciplines of aerospace. For every great aircraft in operation, they have a competition between two finalists who are chosen after multiple rounds of iterations. Examples: The F-35 Lightning had a competitor in the Boeing X-32 at the experimental stage. The F-22 Raptor had a competitor in the YF-23. There is competition between Pratt & Whitney and General electric for the engines. The ecosystem is an extremely competitive technology incubator with SAC and even NASA playing the technology and funding facilitator.
GTRE Improvement Areas
India’s HAL and GTRE have so far been assembly partners to their international partners and this needs to change. The change needs to be based on four pillars: Human Capital Development (HCD), Materials, Funding & Testing Facilities. But first the improvement areas for the Kaveri Program.
The scoping of the Kaveri engine was never realistic from the very beginning. The parameters set down at the get go were the GE-404 turbofan and GE has over a century of experience manufacturing multiple engine types across speed regimes. The more important question is what goes into manufacturing a high performance jet engine. The answer immediately goes back to the four pillars mentioned above.
At the very head of HCD is company culture. GTRE culture is said to be too orthodox, monopolistic and institutional to manage cutting edge advances. They will do well to take a leaf from ISRO’s book and work on ‘ failure based’ design. Having said that, much like a Phoenix rising from the ashes and ISRO after 1994, GTRE can still develop its Human Capital using standard project development methodologies.
Every Project has a critical path and each critical path has milestones. The management of these milestones needs a special kind of project leader, one with deep knowledge of jet engines, governmental affairs & Human Capital Management, if we go back to the Marut failure Kurt Tank the German Engineer was informally accused of a rigid design stance, lack of engagement with the Government, lack of co-ordination across the project critical path & frequent infighting between his German & Indian counterparts. The project manager needs to balance all the abovementioned dynamics, leaning too much in any one direction will deliver below optimal results.
Human Capital needs to feel well compensated and appreciated, especially when they are working and creating something special like the Kaveri Engine. Moreover they need direction from an effective project manager who looks at every failure as an opportunity for a fresh and better improved iteration.Motivation is key when it comes to Teams and they need to feel every failure is one step back, but two steps forward. Losing Human Capital to other countries without a fight is criminal and our Indian ecosystem has to devise a way to keep and nurture our capital. GTRE has to focus on this instead of building the engine itself. The enabler.
Specialized equipment such as the Kaveri engine need special niche materials that are capable of withstanding extreme thermal variations and pressure reliably. Some examples are single crystal turbine blades made of nickel based superalloys such as inconel and rene. Such alloys lack grain boundaries found in traditional metals and their construction renders the blades resistant to thermal fatigue that causes blade deformation. This was a major stumbling block until 2021 when Defense Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL, with great pride I say my Uncle retired as a Director there in the late 1980s) delivered 60 single crystal high pressure turbine blades for HALs indigenous helicopter engine.

In 2025 Lucknow based PTC Industries received an order to manufacture the same for the Kaveri Derivative engine to be used in the Ghatak USAV . While such capabilities are scaling up, the vision of an afterburning Kaveri Engine capable of delivering upto 120 kN thrust 27,000 pounds of thrust should always be kept in the minds of the GTRE enablers. PTC Industries Receives Purchase Order from GTRE for Single Crystal ‘Ready-to-Fit’ Turbine Blades.

Building an afterburning jet engine needs specialized test facilities such as a high altitude wind tunnel and flying test beds. So far GTRE has been dependent on Russia for wind tunnels and their IL-76 test bed for high altitude testing. India already has IL-76s. It’s a matter of modifying one aircraft that can be used for such testing. Being dependent on other countries means negotiating prices (which are never on your side) and waiting for a window of testing as per the other country’s schedule. Furthermore the lack of validation facilities means the incomplete prototype might end up on the test bed and might require going back to the drawing boards after testing. In the United States companies such as Boom Supersonic who are building the non afterburning Symphony engine for their Overture airliner use additive manufacturing (3D printing) to manufacture prototype parts at a rapid pace in their 3D printer farms. This after using CFD (Computerized Fluid Dynamics) to rapidly iterate the right design. The Boom Overture : A Return to Supersonic | theaviationevangelist Such processes speed up the iteration, design improvements & validation by a factor of ten. In house testing and validation facilities are a must.
The cost of developing a new supersonic capable engine with afterburners costs anywhere between $2-5 Bn. In the case of the Kaveri engine the initial tranche of funding dating back to 1989 was $53 Mn. By 2009 the Kaveri project cost approx $595 Mn , and from the project’s perspective had severely overrun projected costs. A much larger perspective is China’s total expenditure of over $42 Bn developing a range of aero engines for their range of aircraft. Funding is extremely important for such projects and the Government & DRDO along with stake holders such as the IAF, Indian Navy & Military need to be clear on their priorities and reserve a significant portion of their expenditure to indigenous R&D instead of looking outside. The last 30 years the IAF has consistently looked outside, be it the Su-30 or the Rafale and to go further back the Mirage 3000 and Jaguar aircraft.
The Future
The Kaveri derivative on the Ghatak UCAV should be viewed through the prism of incremental improvements. Furthermore the engine’s development needs to be viewed as a National ‘Atmanirbhar’ priority and developing the four pillars i.e HCD, Materials Technology Development, consistent funding (including potential cost overruns) & testing infrastructure have to be nurtured and built (common infrastructure is always good and saves costs). On the testing infrastructure Boom Supersonic as an example has consistently spent millions of dollars on inhouse equipment to cut down development lead time. The Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier project is a brilliant example of ‘Atmanirbhar’.

PPP under the GTRE & DRDO’s oversight is the right way forward with cost and profit split. ISRO has already shown the path here as has the Indian Navy with their carriers (they do not yet have a Marine variant of the Tejas fighter yet).
Persistent Indigenous Innovation is the only path to ‘Atmanirbhar’.
Late Edit : Coincidentally at the same time as publishing this article , Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has announced a comprehensive development contract with Safran for the AMCA engine. While this is great for immediate to interim strategic needs, the Kaveri project has to be seen through. True mastery of the jet engine can only then be had.
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